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Abstract 
There is general agreement across the world that human-made climate change is a serious 
global problem, although there are still some skeptics that challenge this view.  Research in 
organization studies on the topic is relatively new.  Much of this research, however, is 
instrumental and managerialist in its focus on ‘win-win’ opportunities for business  or its 
treatment of climate change as just another corporate social responsibility (CSR) exercise.  In 
this paper, we suggest that climate change is not just an environmental problem requiring 
technical and managerial solutions; it is a political issue where a variety of organizations – 
state agencies, firms, industry associations, NGOs, and multilateral organizations – engage in 
contestation as well as collaboration over the issue.  We discuss the strategic, institutional 
and political economy dimensions of climate change and develop a socioeconomic regimes 
approach as a synthesis of these different theoretical perspectives.  Given the urgency of the 
problem and the need for a rapid transition to a low carbon economy, there is a pressing need 
for organization scholars to develop a better understanding of apathy and inertia in the face of 
the current crisis and to identify paths toward transformative change.  The seven papers in 
this special issue address these areas of research and examine strategies, discourses, identities 
and practices in relation to climate change at multiple levels. . 
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Climate Change and the Emergence of New Organizational Landscapes 
 Let us start with some numbers.  There appears to be a general consensus among the 
countries that constitute the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) that a 2˚Celsius warming of the planet will have dangerous, perhaps even 
catastrophic consequences.  It will take 1 trillion tons of carbon in the atmosphere to reach 
the 2˚ mark.  In the last 250 years human activity has added 500 billion tons of carbon in the 
atmosphere.  At current rates of carbon emissions it will take 30 years to add the next 500 
billion tons (trillionthton.org, 2012).   
More than 20 years after climate change was recognized as a critical problem, efforts 
to address them show a record of failure (McKibben, 2012).  Despite high-level efforts by all 
states under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, there is still no global legally binding 
agreement to effectively cut carbon dioxide emissions globally.  At the business level, while 
there is increasing awareness of the problem as well as some corporate involvement through 
sustainability policies and practices, carbon disclosure, emissions trading and energy 
efficiency, little has been done in terms of reducing actual emissions or transforming core 
corporate products and processes.  The drastic cuts in emissions of greenhouse gasses 
proposed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and many non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) require radical and fundamental shifts in socio-political 
structures, technological and economic systems, organizational forms, and modes of 
organizing (den Elzen et al., 2009; IPCC, 2007).  It also requires a dramatic shift in cultural 
values and personal identities, if consumption patterns involving carbon intense lifestyles are 
to change.  However, as McKibben (2012) points out, with very few exceptions ‘the rule is 
ever more carbon’.  
These major shifts pose a threat to companies and countries with vested interests in 
fossil fuel related sectors. They also threaten the comforts and conveniences that many take 
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for granted in industrialized countries, and which others aspire to as symbols of status and 
prestige.  At the same time, climate change also presents substantial business opportunities 
and the potential for countries to develop their clean energy sectors.  Thus, climate change is 
not just an environmental problem requiring technical and managerial solutions.  It is an 
institutional, economic, social, cultural and political challenge with significant implications 
for the way economies, societies, inter-state relations and regulatory systems are organized 
(Giddens, 2011; Hulme, 2009; Stern, 2007).  
However, signs that such transformation is imminent seem dim.  The 1990s were 
marked by political wrangling as countries sought to develop an international agreement to 
manage climate change.  At the corporate level, there was very little action except to oppose 
any regulation or mandatory emission limits.  By the late 1990s, as consensus on the science 
of climate change grew and the Kyoto Protocol came into force, companies appeared ready to 
compromise and face the inevitability of carbon regulation.  Industry largely dropped its 
aggressive opposition to carbon regulation and investment in clean energy grew rapidly.  
However, outside of a few countries in Europe, there was very little progress in emissions 
reductions. The global recession saw a significant decline in climate change action from 2008 
onwards due to the collapse of public budgets, rising unemployment and a resurgence in 
climate denial (McCright & Dunlap, 2011).  As a result, climate change has virtually dropped 
off the political agenda in most countries, and restarting economic growth has become a 
priority. 
The year 2010, when our special issue first called for submissions, saw the highest 
total annual growth in global CO2 emissions.  Carbon emissions dropped during 2008 mainly 
due to the global financial crisis but only for one year. Despite several policy measures to 
curb emissions, such as emissions trading, carbon taxes and green investment schemes, 
carbon emissions have continued to grow.  Climate legislation in the US, which received a 
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boost following President Obama’s election in 2008, has since been stalled at the federal 
level. In Europe, public spending cuts have seen renewable energy subsidies suffer, most 
notably in the solar power industry (Fortson, 2012).  If investments in renewable technologies 
are crucial to address climate change then industry and policy strategies appear to be 
reversing direction.  Subsidies to the global renewables industry amount to $66 billion in 
2010, compared to the $409 billion received by the fossil fuel industry (Clark, 2012).  
At the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009, described as a spectacular failure by 
most observers (Bond, 2010; Carter et al., 2011), the only point of agreement was that any 
increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius to prevent catastrophic 
changes in the planet.  Burning the current oil reserves of just six oil firms – ExxonMobil, 
BP, Gazprom, Chevron. ConocoPhillips and Shell – would consume more than a quarter of 
the available atmospheric space to remain under the 2-degree mark (McKibben, 2012).  Not 
only does the fossil fuel industry continue to burn its oil reserves with impunity, it is 
unrelenting in its search for new sources of oil and gas.  The few corporations that had made 
small investments in exploring renewable energy sources have now shut down most of these 
projects and are refocusing on their core oil and gas businesses.  The fossil fuel industry is 
not just a major contributor to global warming but also a powerful political actor that has 
been successful in preventing any meaningful action on climate change (McKibben, 2012). 
Climate change has created a new vocabulary and concepts like ‘carbon accounting’, 
‘emissions trading’, ‘carbon neutral production’, ‘green banking’, ‘green investment’, ‘green 
innovation’, ‘renewable technology’ and ‘carbon disclosure’ seem to have captured the 
public and organizational imagination. However, both in terms of theoretical development in 
organization studies and corporate practice, responses to climate change have been dismal 
(Goodall, 2008; Patenaude, 2010).  The climate change debate has been dominated by 
scientists, economists, corporate interests and environmentalists, with marginal attention paid 
 8 
to the organizational innovations and institutional change that are required to address the 
problem. 
There is, to be sure, a significant literature on the impact of climate change on 
business and the range of actions being taken by industry.  But much of this remains at the 
descriptive level with less attention and precision on developing frameworks for 
understanding the prospects and limits of organizational climate strategies and, more broadly, 
the transformative impact of climate change on the organizational landscape.  Equally lacking 
are analyses of institutional and political processes required for change.  There have been a 
number of insightful accounts on reporting and voluntary standards (Bowen & Wittneben, 
2011; Kolk, 2010); the role of climate scientists as boundary spanners (Rothenberg & Levy, 
2012), managerial perceptions (Banerjee, 2001; Okereke & Russel, 2010) and corporate 
political strategy (Levy & Egan, 2003; Levy & Newell, 2005).  Most studies have focused on 
identifying corporate responses to climate change and the drivers of corporate climate 
strategies with little attention being paid to theoretical development of models for 
understanding action and inaction.  This special issue is an effort to broaden this avenue of 
scholarship.  
In our view, a key limitation in advancing a robust organizationally relevant theory 
for climate change is the strength of disciplinary boundaries prevalent in academic 
scholarship. Organizational strategies to address climate change include traditional strategic 
risk management approaches, technological innovation, entrepreneurship and corporate social 
responsibility.  But perhaps unlike any issue before it, climate change entails the active 
involvement of state, intergovernmental and societal actors with differing levels of interest, 
authority, legitimacy and capacity to participate in decision-making.  Corporate actors are 
therefore part of a wider multi-level and multi-actor governance system comprising a vast 
and disparate infrastructure of institutions, markets, rules, norms, and discursive formations. 
 9 
Hence, theoretical endeavors to understand the transformative implications of climate change 
for organizations must draw from other disciplines and adopt a more diverse set of theoretical 
perspectives, including political economy (Banerjee, 2008a; Foster, 2002; Lohmann, 2010; 
Newell & Paterson, 2010); complexity theory (Levy & Lichtenstein, 2012); discourse 
analysis (Boykoff, 2008), global and local governance (Banerjee, 2011a; Biermann, 2007) 
and Gramscian hegemony (Levy & Egan 2003; Okereke, Bulkeley, & Schroeder, 2009).   
In what follows we adopt this multi-level perspective by showing the contributions 
and limitations of some theoretical perspectives used to explain the structural inertia in 
tackling climate change.  These include management strategy, institutional theory (in 
particular, institutional entrepreneurship), and international political economy. These theories 
employ different levels of analysis: individual, organizational, institutional, and political 
economy.  We offer a socioeconomic regimes approach in an attempt to synthesize different 
theoretical perspectives and provide a critical research agenda that should complement such 
an enterprise. 
 
Organizational and Strategic Dimensions of Climate Change 
Early research on business and climate change highlighted corporate engagement with 
political processes as a key activity (Levy & Egan, 2003).  For example, a group of large 
multinational companies formed the Global Climate Coalition in 1998 in an effort to oppose 
the Kyoto Protocol and delay any immediate action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
(Newell & Paterson, 1998).  Corporations and industry associations attempted to undermine 
the scientific basis of climate as well as influence climate policy by opposing mandatory 
emissions targets.  As new markets for low-carbon technologies began to emerge, and 
scientific evidence about the anthropogenic impact on climate change mounted alongside the 
growing political and reputational costs of continued opposition, many businesses changed 
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course.  They began to focus their efforts on developing policies and assigning 
responsibilities to measure and manage carbon, though the progress toward actual emissions 
reduction was much slower (Jones & Levy, 2007).  While some environmental organizations 
partnered with corporations to develop climate change strategies, most civil society 
organizations dismissed corporate responses to climate change as greenwashing or tokenistic 
corporate social responsibility (Banerjee, 2008a; le Menestrel & de Bettignies, 2002; Tokar, 
1997).  
 Subsequent research on how business firms are responding to climate change has 
focused on the market and strategic dimensions of climate change (Kolk & Pinske, 2005; 
Levy & Kolk, 2002; Wittneben & Kiyar, 2009; Okereke & Russel, 2010).  The framing of 
climate change as ‘strategic’ stems from the notion that corporate responses to environmental 
issues are driven not just by environmental concerns or social pressures, but by the pursuit of 
business competitiveness (Banerjee, Iyer & Kashyap, 2003).  Using this frame, businesses 
will develop climate strategy when they are convinced that doing so will give them 
competitive advantage and conversely that failure to act will cost them value or market share 
(Okereke, 2007).  Accordingly, business firms develop climate strategies that provide market 
advantages while minimizing risks based on factors such as levels of exposure to legal and 
regulatory risks, environmental reputation, cost advantages and technological innovation 
(Haigh & Griffiths, 2012; Hoffman, 2005) 
 Most corporate responses to climate change are focused on voluntary measures or 
increasing efficiencies in the supply chain rather than commitment to any mandatory 
emissions reductions targets or developing a new business model (Banerjee & Bonnefous, 
2011; Okereke & McDaniels, 2012).  Due to the absence of a significant price on carbon, 
purely voluntary and market-based initiatives have not led to a significant reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Product and process improvements in emission intensity 
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(greenhouse gas emissions per unit of output) tend to be nullified by increased output and 
sales (Jones & Levy, 2007).  Thus, business responses to climate change, whether they are 
framed as ‘strategic’ or as a firm’s corporate social responsibility, remain focused on ‘win-
win’ solutions that must generate financial benefits for firms.  A key insight of the strategic 
perspective that helps explain corporate inertia is that firms have specialized competencies 
and assets, and cannot easily change direction.  Fear of stranded assets is therefore a major 
reason for corporate inaction on climate change.     
Organizational and management approaches to climate change suffer from several 
limitations.  First, there is a tendency to treat firms as isolated units divorced from their 
prevailing social and political context.  Focus on the micro level of the firm obscures several 
important connections and relationships relevant for climate strategy.  These include 
connections between the firm and industry groups, the relationship between market and non-
market forces, and the role of a variety of societal and institutional factors in shaping the 
governance of climate change.  Not enough attention has been paid to the politics of 
contestation and representation that shape policies and production systems, ideologies and 
identities, and alliances and accommodation in relation to climate change (Levy & Newell, 
2005).  
Second, strategic management is focused on analyzing the external environment and 
firm capabilities to determine the best course of action.  It takes for granted existing corporate 
governance systems, the growth imperative, wider cultural discourses that prioritize limitless 
growth in production and consumption, and notions of competitiveness, innovation and 
entrepreneurship, with little consideration about their impact on the planet.  Accordingly, 
strategic management offers no insights on how or why firms might act to change the 
prevailing environment.  This is a fatal limitation if one is concerned about how to break 
systematic inertia and achieve transformational change.  Finally, while references have been 
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made to discontinuities and exogenous shocks (Handy, 1989), embedding sustainability 
(Banerjee, 2011b) and disruptive innovation (Christensen, 1997), the overwhelming notion of 
change in strategic management reflects incremental rather than transformational change.  
Organizational theory is therefore largely out of its depth in situations where radical action is 
required, which is the case with climate change. 
Thus, a broader theoretical perspective is required to understand the process of change 
needed to combat inertia.  As mentioned before climate change is a global issue and firms are 
actors in wider fields that include a diversity of actors and institutions from the market, state, 
and civil society sectors as well as international bodies that are involved in climate change 
negotiations.  Corporate practices are shaped not just by economic forces but also by 
generally accepted norms, and institutionalized routines and practices.  The institutional 
environment plays a key role in determining the nature of climate regimes, and there is 
considerable contestation over elements of this institutional environment.   Thus, one way to 
understand the emergence of particular climate regimes is to use insights from institutional 
theory.   
 
Institutional Dimensions of Climate Change 
The institutionalization of climate change began in the early 1990s with the formation 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.  While the parties to the 
convention shared similar concerns about climate change, agreement on how to address the 
problem continues to be elusive.  Corporations do not just respond to institutional pressures 
but also exercise power over the institutional framework through strategies that are overtly or 
implicitly political. 
Institutional entrepreneurship is a process whereby actors in an institutional field use 
their resources to shape new institutions that promote their interests, thus bringing about 
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institutional change (DiMaggio, 1988; Eisenstadt, 1980).  Fields can emerge around a 
common issue facing various organizations, such as climate change, rather than a common 
product or market (Hoffman, 1999).  Viewed from this perspective, corporate climate 
strategies are an outcome of various internal and external pressures, stemming not only from 
current regulation and competitiveness, but also from the cultural and symbolic context in 
which companies operate.  An examination of climate change using perspectives from 
institutional theory will shed light on the various actors that firms try to influence and are 
influenced by, including policy makers, competitors, NGOs, industry associations, climate 
scientists, and the media.   
The institutional field of climate change operates neither smoothly nor 
democratically, but can be described as ‘institutional war‘ (Hoffman, 1999: 352).  At the 
international policy level governments routinely clash over their differentiated 
responsibilities in addressing climate change; at the national policy level industry actors 
intensively lobby governments not to impose stringent regulation while environmental groups 
lobby for stronger legislation; at the organizational level companies struggle to balance 
investors’ demand for constant profitable returns with resource limitations; at the individual 
level consumers face tradeoffs between enjoying comfortable lifestyles and reducing their 
carbon footprint.  
While the structural power of an institution can constrain agents and stabilize a field, 
agents can also use their power to generate institutional conflict and change (McAdam & 
Scott, 2005).  Institutional change occurs either when there is a shift in power relations in an 
organizational field or when the goals of powerful actors change, in which case they can 
enable or suppress radical change (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996).  For example, the power of 
the fossil fuel lobby in influencing the institutional field is the main reason for weak action 
on climate change: while new institutions governing carbon disclosure and emissions trading 
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have emerged, they remain relatively weak in mandating emissions cuts in the face of strong 
opposition by the fossil fuel industry and its lobbyists (McKibben, 2012).  Power is 
inextricably intertwined with institutional change, yet remarkably most institutional theorists 
either elide the question of power or treat it structurally as an endogenous variable.  A critical 
analysis of institutional theory reveal power struggles within organizations as well as 
between organizations and other institutional actors, enabling us to imagine new modes of 
organizing, 
Institutional fields achieve a degree of stability when their discursive, economic, and 
political dimensions are aligned and mutually reinforcing (Levy & Scully, 2007).  At the 
material level fields require a viable ‘business model’ that generates sufficient resources to 
enable the reproduction of the field and gain the cooperation of the relevant network of 
actors.  In climate change, we have seen a shift away from the ‘development aid’ logic of the 
UNFCCC to the ‘market’ logic of the Kyoto Protocol (Wittneben, 2007) that leads into the 
current logic of the ‘green economy’ and ‘sustainable development’.  These formulations can 
be seen as a hegemonic move, an assertion of complementarity between economic growth 
and sustainability that provides the discursive basis for a political strategy to build a coalition 
around the project of ecological modernization.   The deliberate breadth and vagueness of 
these concepts glosses over contradictions and emphasizes a common interest in both 
sustainability and economic development in an attempt to create consensus among a diverse 
group of actors while excluding more marginal and radical voices (Banerjee, 2003). 
The power-knowledge nexus that Foucault (1980) wrote so profoundly about is 
evident in the institutional logic that governs the field of climate change.  Knowledge 
produced about particular practices in addressing climate change reproduces and sustains 
prevailing social and economic structures.  Institutions may well be socially constructed and 
discursively produced but analyzing discourses alone will not lead to a complete 
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understanding of the political processes involved in institutional change.  Thus, identifying 
power as a central unit of analysis of institutional fields leads us to a discussion of the 
political economy of climate change.  In the field of climate change, political power of the 
institutions that govern climate change, material power of transnational corporations and 
discursive power of the ecological modernization paradigm shape courses of action (or 
inaction) while sustaining existing material inequalities and forms of political power, as we 
will see in the next section. 
 
Political Economy of Climate Change 
 Since the state, the market and civil society constitute the political economy of 
climate change it is important to examine their interactions and relationships with other.  
Climate change is a global issue and while national governments have a key role to play in 
climate policy, the global governance of climate change occurs in a broader international 
political economy.  These international institutional structures determine the prospects and 
limits of political agency and action.   
The expansion of neoliberal capitalism over the last 30 years has transformed the role 
of the state where its key role is to maintain the conditions for capital accumulation, which is 
vital for its political legitimacy and survival.  Economic competitiveness gains social and 
political legitimacy through an ideology that promotes the notion that societal progress can 
only be achieved through economic growth and free markets.  Economic forces become 
paramount in shaping public policy.  In addition to the structural power of market institutions 
and the economic power of states and large transnational corporations, the political economy 
of climate change is shaped by cultural politics where the exercise of power becomes 
‘rationalized’ (Foucault, 1980).  In the context of climate change, the market-state nexus 
reinforces the structural capabilities of capitalism by positioning itself ‘above’ society in 
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creating and sustaining climate regimes that do not pose a threat to current regimes of 
accumulation.  Discursive power is apparent in the widespread assumption that the 
atmosphere can be protected only by commodifying it and controlling its means of exchange.  
Thus, the ideological basis of climate policy creates an economy of climate capitalism 
whereby market mechanisms such as venture capital-financed innovation and carbon trading 
become the primary mechanisms to reduce emissions, with an emphasis on voluntary rather 
than legislative measures.  
Thus, climate policy instruments are a reflection more of the power and authority of 
actors than  ‘scientific’ or ‘efficient’ measures to mitigate the effects of climate change.  
Emissions trading, for example, was supported by powerful corporations who were opposed 
to the introduction of a carbon tax, which had been the preferred policy instrument of several 
governmental and non-governmental organizations.  The fact that the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme has failed to deliver on its stated predictions of significant 
emissions reductions reflects a weakness of this particular policy instrument (Pinkse & Kolk, 
2009; Wittneben, 2009). 
Neo-Gramscian perspectives can provide useful insights for a critical analysis of the 
political economy of climate change.  Inequalities are sustained through hegemonic 
relationships between the elite classes, the state and civil society where the dominant class is 
able to link its interests with the subordinate classes to create and maintain a social order that 
reproduces its own dominant position (Cox, 1987; Gramsci, 1971).  Institutions that arise 
from this state-society complex also become the sites for political contestation primarily 
because they have partial autonomy from the bureaucratic authority of the state. Hegemony is 
therefore contingent and accommodative.  Power is neither static nor a zero sum game but 
resides in part in the strategies and ability of constituent groups and institutional 
entrepreneurs to maneuver and reconfigure interests, coalitions and alliances within limits.   
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A neo-Gramsian framework offers a different theoretical perspective in analyzing 
climate governance broadly and corporate climate strategies in particular. First, the 
perspective recognizes the economic root of prevailing social structures (Cox 1987; Gramsci 
1971). Second, the approach has a broader and more critical conception of power and 
politics, which provides a more sophisticated analysis of interests, authority, and legitimacy 
in political contestations and accommodations (Levy & Newell, 2005).  Finally, the 
framework is sensitive to the intricate relationship between structure and agency, the 
transformative potential and limits of civil society and the role of cognitive-ideational factors 
(Bernstein, 2001). 
For example, a neo-Gramscian perspective on corporate responses to climate change 
can highlight the structural limits of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate 
citizenship strategies while also revealing points of resistance (Banerjee, 2008a).  From a 
climate governance perspective, everyday practices of companies can be understood as being 
‘political’ and activities such as CSR, carbon neutrality, carbon disclosure, emissions trading 
and the like also become terrains of contestation: once the door is open for business to 
negotiate sustainability discourses, civil society actors can push for more transparency and 
accountability, and corporations try to demonstrate their commitment to sustainability while 
maintaining their autonomy (Levy & Kaplan, 2008).  
To summarize: we have discussed strategic, institutional and political economy 
approaches to understanding climate change.  These are not discrete frameworks but reflect 
the complex organizational landscape of climate change constituted by a network of actors, 
including business, NGOs, and governmental agencies, involved in collaboration and 
sometimes contestation over everything from the science of the issue to the role of 
government and markets in addressing it.  Linking these actors is an array of economic, 
technological, cultural, and political structures and processes.  Organizations are therefore 
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part of a larger system within which they struggle to survive and flourish, at times adapting to 
the dynamic and unexpected shifts in the terrain, and at others attempting to influence the 
contours of this system.  Societal responses to climate change are shifting the organizational 
landscape in complex ways, erecting market and regulatory hurdles that are constraining the 
political and market power of some fossil fuel based companies, particularly coal, while 
creating opportunities for new clean tech companies, environmental organizations, and 
regulatory agencies to grow and broaden their reach. 
In the case of climate change, the physical ecology and climatology of the earth of the 
earth is itself part of this larger system.  Climate change is, of course, the result of our 
carbon-intense production system, consumerist culture, and the political power of fossil fuel 
related interests to perpetuate this system.  Simultaneously, climate change reshapes the 
organizational landscape through its direct and indirect impacts on the economy, culture, and 
politics.  The planet provides vast quantities of natural resources, such as fuels, food, fresh 
water, and recycling services, and though these might appear to be ‘free’, the substantial 
economic value of these ‘ecosystem services’ is only now gaining attention as their supply is 
threatened (Costanza, 1997).  Climate change itself represents a threat to these resources, and 
to the businesses and workers who depend on them.  Drought, for example, affects not only 
fresh water and agriculture but also electricity from hydropower and transportation on rivers. 
Sea level rise, storms and flooding associated with climate change directly threaten coastal 
infrastructure, potentially imposing huge costs for repairs and protection, or adaptation. 
Climate change is already influencing the culture, through media representations (Boykoff, 
2008) and growing environmental awareness.  Finally, climate change is reshaping politics, 
stimulating the rise of new multilateral sources of authority such as the Intergovernmental 
Panel Convention on Climate Change and United Nations Environmental Program, the 
growth of innovative market governance mechanisms such as carbon trading, as well as 
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triggering the emergence of powerful issue-specific industry associations, such as the Global 
Climate Coalition.  Indeed, climate change has become deeply enmeshed with a broader 
cultural and political struggle, at least in the United States, over the role of the state, 
regulations, and taxation.  In the final section before introducing the papers in the special 
issue, we attempt to provide a theoretical synthesis of our arguments. 
 
A Socioeconomic Regimes Approach: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis 
Understanding organizations within the context of larger systems has a venerable 
history in management and organization theory (Emery & Trist, 1965; Thompson, 1967).  
Economists have long recognized that distorted private incentives facing individual actors 
create collective action failures that lead to inertia and sub-optimal outcomes.  For example, 
Ostrom (2009) identifies climate change as a classic collective action problem, and suggests a 
polycentric approach that relies on small-scale, regional institutions and governance 
mechanisms to encourage trust and experimentation, taking advantage of local, often non-
pecuniary incentives to cooperate.  The systems perspective has recently gained acceptance 
even within mainstream strategy.  As Gulati et al. (2000) argue, ‘the image of atomistic 
actors competing for profits against each other in an impersonal marketplace is increasingly 
inadequate in a world in which firms are embedded in networks of social, professional, and 
exchange relationships with other organizational actors’.  Gulati’s strategic networks 
approach, however, focuses on the impact of the network on individual firms, rather than the 
functioning of the system, and along with the collective action framework, does not attempt 
to theorize the differential power and interests of various actors.  Institutional theory’s focus 
on the field within a larger societal context does move some way toward a systems 
perspective, though as discussed earlier, its treatment of economic and political processes and 
structures is somewhat limited. 
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Here we outline a conceptual framework that provides some analytical traction for 
understanding this organizational landscape.  We approach this landscape as a complex 
socioeconomic regime comprising actors engaged with the climate issue and the economic, 
technological, political, and cultural forces in which they are enmeshed.  Following Jessop, 
(2010), we locate this system within a cultural political economy framework, highlighting the 
interaction between cultural, semiotic dimensions of the energy system, and its material, or 
its technological and economic elements.  Jessop (2010: 344) has developed the concept of an 
‘economic imaginary’ to refer to ‘a specific configuration of genres, discourses and styles 
and thereby constitute the semiotic moment of a network of social practices in a given social 
field, institutional order, or wider social formation’.  An imaginary generates a sense of 
shared meaning, identity, and interests within a network of actors, but a socioeconomic 
regime also gains cohesion from economic structures that provide material rewards and from 
political processes that construct regulatory frameworks and provide incentives and 
disciplinary mechanisms.  For a socioeconomic regime to achieve hegemonic stability in a 
Gramscian sense, these cultural, economic, and political elements need to be aligned and 
mutually reinforcing (Levy & Scully, 2007).  
Drawing from Gramsci, Jessop contends that the contested terrain of economic 
imaginaries is central to the political struggle for hegemony in the wider socioeconomic 
regime.  Reflecting a more political and strategic orientation than is usually found in the 
institutional literature, Jessop notes that the struggle to establish a particular imaginary 
requires actors ‘to articulate strategies, projects and visions oriented to these imagined 
economies’ as they seek to mobilize a historical bloc to support a particular path.  Crucially, 
these imaginaries are closely intertwined with the economic dimensions of a socioeconomic 
regime, so that the successful emergence of a new hegemonic imaginary ‘does correspond in 
significant ways to the changes in core technologies, labor processes, enterprise forms, modes 
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of competition, and economic “identity politics”’ (Jessop, 2010: 346).  Thus the stabilization 
of a socioeconomic regime requires a cultural imaginary to be supported and validated with 
real material elements of the system. 
To illustrate, Jessop discusses rise of a neo-Keynesian ‘Green New Deal’ (GND) 
economic imaginary in response to the 2008 financial crisis.  The GND offers considerable 
potential to achieve hegemonic status because it ‘is being narrated as capitalism’s best hope 
to create jobs, restore growth, and limit climate change’ (Jessop, 2010: 350-2).  The GND 
represents an approach to addressing climate change based on ecological modernization 
(Hajer, 1995), a reliance on innovation for low carbon-technologies alongside new market 
mechanisms such as carbon pricing and trading.  The GND is therefore attractive, partly on 
account of the ‘fuzzinesss’ of the concept, to a range of key actors, including business, state 
actors, professionals, policymakers, and environmentalists.  It also has traction across scales, 
from local governments interested in building regional clean tech clusters to national 
governments seeking new sources of growth and competitiveness, to multilateral 
organizations in need of framing climate policy in business friendly terms.  Jessop’s keen 
insight here is that the GND’s hegemonic appeal is due to its materialization in production 
systems, in terms of the rapid rate of innovation and market growth in the clean tech sector, 
closely coupled with its penetration into the realm of culture and personal identity.  As we 
will see later, the papers in our special issue address different dimensions of the 
socioeconomic regime, ranging from personal identity construction and negotiation, business 
friendly climate regimes and hegemonic accommodation.  
The socioeconomic regime relating to energy and climate change extends beyond the 
core fossil fuel sectors to include energy intense sectors such as airlines, automobiles, and 
chemicals, as well as clean energy products and services.  This regime represents an issue-
level field that ‘forms around a central issue--such as the protection of the natural 
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environment--rather than a central technology or market [and] introduces the idea that fields 
become centers of debates in which competing interests negotiate’ (Hoffman, 1999: 351).  In 
their synthesis of institutional and social movement theory, McAdam and Scott (2005: 18) 
describe the negotiated stability that can be attained in these issue level fields, despite 
ongoing tensions: ‘The stability we have in mind is rather the hard fought for and fragile state 
of affairs that Zysman (1994) terms an “institutional settlement” - an agreement negotiated 
primarily by the efforts of field dominants (and their…allies) to preserve a status quo that 
generally serves their interests’.  
Our socioeconomic regimes framework brings together insights from sociotechnical 
systems and transitions literature with the political understanding of governance regimes.  
The sociotechnical systems approach provides a systems perspective on the inertia of the 
energy system, understanding the excessive stability of the fossil fuel based economy as a 
function of mature and profitable technologies, market failures that obscure externalities and 
obstruct collective action, and institutionalized social practices (Brown & Vergragt, 2006; 
Geels & Schot, 2007).  This literature explores the possibilities for transforming energy value 
regimes through ‘radical improvements in resource efficiency in products, technologies and 
lifestyles’ (Truffer & Coenen, 2012).  The trajectory of these regimes is guided by the 
coevolution of their components, including technologies, markets, regulation and standards, 
infrastructure, political and social institutions, and user practices (Garud & Karnoe, 2001; 
Geels, 2004).   Changes can be driven by pressures in the cultural and political spheres, 
technological innovation, external shocks, or internal dynamics that create misalignment and 
instability in the regime (Smith, Stirling, & Berkhout, 2005).  Emerging sociotechnical 
configurations, such as clean energy, are generally fragile because their technologies are 
immature and expensive, they threaten vested interests, and do not yet enjoy widespread 
political support or cultural acceptance.  The transitions literature considers the conditions 
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under which promising niches can survive and grow in protected market or geographic 
segments (Geels & Schot, 2007; Raven, 2007). 
While most organizational scholars are familiar with the terminology of fields and 
institutional theory, we prefer the conceptual framework of socioeconomic regimes for 
several reasons.  First, institutional theory remains a rather generic way of addressing 
collectivities of actors, and the framework remains constrained by the core insight that fields 
are stabilized and reproduced through social rules, norms, and routines.  Institutional theory 
tends, therefore, to be a structural explanation of conformity that generally ignores economic 
and political forces at the field level and in the wider society.  Institutional theory has, of 
course, been stretched and refurbished to address, for example, agency and power through the 
notion of institutional entrepreneurship, and individual identities through the idea of 
institutional work.  Institutional theory remains, however, a rather slender structure to support 
these enhancements, and ultimately offers a language and framework of analysis rather than 
theoretical insights. 
The sociotechnical transitions approach has been criticized for its emphasis on 
technology and innovation at the expense of power and politics, though recent work has tried 
to redress this (Meadowcroft, 2011).  As Truffer and Coenen note (2012:12), ‘Sustainability 
transitions are by their very nature political projects. They concern future living conditions of 
societies on a global scale’.  The development of clean energy niches can be conceived as 
Gramscian counter-hegemonic struggle, an extended strategic ‘war of position’ coordinated 
across multiple dimensions of a system.  Truffer and Coenen (2012:11) describes niche 
development not just as a technological phenomenon but as the active work of agents in 
‘institutional adaptation, constituency building, the articulation of expectations and visions, 
and network formation’.   
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Socioeconomic regimes also serve as mechanisms of governance that structure and 
organize an arena, often amidst considerable contestation.  A Gramscian perspective provides 
insight into the complex power relations at play, the structural conditions for stability, and 
possibilities for agents to challenge dominant actors and shift the system.  We define 
governance ‘broadly here to mean the rules, institutions, and norms that channel and 
constrain economic activity and its impacts’ (Levy, 2008: 946).  Governance is therefore a 
multi-level, multi-actor concept that includes not only national-level regulation and formal 
international agreements but also the discipline of capital markets and corporate governance 
systems, the coordination of supply chains, the legal and accounting mechanisms that 
structure carbon markets (Kolk, Levy, & Pinkse, 2008), the corporate decision processes that 
shape energy markets and technologies, and the promulgation of voluntary reporting 
mechanisms such as the Carbon Disclosure Project (Knox-Hayes & Levy, 2011).  The neo-
Gramscian perspective (Cox, 1987; Gill, 1993) is particularly useful for locating 
socioeconomic regimes within broader governance structures of neoliberal ideologies, 
institutions, and geopolitical relations. 
In our call for papers for this special issue we invited contributions that reflected the 
complexity of climate change.  We wanted papers that offered a broader focus rather than the 
conventional win-win approach that underlies much of the literature on environmental 
sustainability and climate change.  The papers we selected for the special issue reflect our 
intention to broaden the debate and open the door for critical, multidisciplinary and multi-
level analysis. 
 
The Papers  
The papers in this special issue use a variety of analytical lenses to address issues of 
stability and change at various levels, and the socioeconomic regimes approach provides a 
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useful framework to consider their contributions.  Several papers examine the politics and 
processes of change at the level of discourse, culture, and identity.  Using different 
perspectives, these papers suggest that if society is to face up to the challenge of climate 
change, the primary struggle is in the semiotic realm, to establish a new imaginary as the 
basis for transforming the socioeconomic regime.  From a neo-Gramscian perspective, 
hegemony is rooted in the shared everyday understandings that permeate broad groups in 
society, not just the elites, but also the institutions of civil society, such as the mass media, 
that are key in shaping these ideas.  The meanings attached to climate change by corporate 
managers are crucial, because their decisions regarding technologies and production methods, 
products and marketing, energy management, and lobbying activity, put them on the front 
lines in either sustaining the existing carbon intense regime or initiating a process of change.  
We begin the special issue with Wright, Nyberg and Grant’s paper (2012) that 
explores how sustainability managers in large corporations make sense of climate change and 
how they develop multiple, sometimes conflicted, senses of identity based on the discursive 
breezes that swirl around them at work and outside.  Their qualitative study identified three 
types of identities: the ‘green change agent’, the ‘rational manager’ and the ‘committed 
activist’.  While the discursive construction of identities enabled individual managers to 
negotiate the competing demands of environmentalism versus organizational profitability it 
also highlighted the limits of what ‘committed activists’ can or cannot do to influence 
corporate strategy.  The authors conclude that for climate change to become a truly 
transformative and broad social movement individual subjectivities and identities need to be 
related to the issue.  Such a transformation however seems unlikely at the present time where 
the ‘rational’ discourse of climate change remains dominant:  corporations will focus their 
efforts on increasing energy efficiencies because they provide operational advantages rather 
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than invest heavily in renewable energy sources or seek to develop an alternative business 
model. 
Continuing with the theme of identity Lefsrud and Meyer (2012) turn their attention 
to how scientific ‘experts’ in climate change negotiate their identities in the Canadian oil and 
natural gas industry.  They describe the strategies by which these professionals attempt to 
support their identities and positions, and to legitimate their claims to expertise.  These 
experts actively engage in defensive institutional work that opposes any meaningful action on 
climate change.  Defensive institutional work is facilitated by identity work where experts 
legitimate their expertise while delegitimizing opposing views.  Experts vary in their opinions 
on the causes of climate change and the policies required to address climate change.  While 
many of them are engaged in aspects of ‘institutional defense’, the paper does point to the 
considerable heterogeneity of framings and identities that these professionals invoke as they 
attempt to respond personally and organizationally to the challenges of climate change.  
These contested views are also a contributing factor for inaction on climate change.  Lefsrud 
and Meyer (2012) suggest that emphasizing climate change as a risk and ‘common enemy to 
be managed’ may overcome current inaction.  However, as they point out despite differing in 
their opinions climate change experts in the oil and natural gas industry are bound by a 
common economic interest.  Economic rationality inevitably tends to evaluate climate action 
using a win-win framework and just like the sustainability managers that were the subject of 
Wright, Nyberg and Grant’s study (2012), scientific experts also promote the safer but 
ultimately limited win-win solutions to climate change. 
Moving now from how managers make sense of climate change and how experts 
construct their expertise on the science of climate change to how information about climate 
change is deployed in the public sphere, Mackay and Munro (2012) analyze information 
campaigns of two key protagonists who are also adversaries in the field: the oil giant 
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ExxonMobil and the environmental organization, Greenpeace.  The fossil fuel industry is 
widely seen by many environmental organizations as a powerful group that is largely to be 
blamed for inaction on climate change.  Mackay and Munro (2012) describe the range of 
informational tactics deployed by ExxonMobil and Greenpeace as a ‘war of position’ to 
influence public perception on climate change.  Departing from discursive and institutional 
approaches to climate change the authors argue that in the climate change debate information 
becomes a deliberate weapon (instead of a tool or resource to transmit knowledge) that is 
used instrumentally by both corporations and environmental organizations to influence public 
perception.  Understanding the range of tactics deployed by organizations allow us to see 
how particular positions are created, how conflicts emerge and are managed, how 
negotiations proceed and how compromises are reached.  Both organizations use a variety of 
networks to establish their respective position in the public sphere:  ExxonMobil funded a 
number of ‘non-governmental organizations’ which were essentially climate skeptic lobby 
groups and policy think tanks that attacked the science of climate change.  Greenpeace’s 
counter tactics was to show legislators, policy makers and the public that much of 
ExxonMobil’s ‘scientific’ reports did not follow established scientific traditions and methods 
but were designed to influence public perception and preempt regulation. 
One of the many paradoxes surrounding the climate change debate is how urgency 
and inaction appear to reside comfortably in the same discursive space.  ‘Time is running out’ 
is a constant refrain of concerned publics but there is very little meaningful action to address 
the problem.  Slawinski and Bansal (2012) in their study of Canadian oil and gas companies 
examine how a firm’s perspective on time relates to its climate change strategies. The authors 
argue that conventional approaches to environmental issues that describe corporate strategies 
as reactive-proactive or short term-long term do not capture the nuances of time in the 
context of climate change or explain how firms can balance urgency with long term effects.  
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Two time perspectives emerged from their analysis – linear time and cyclical time – leading 
to different responses, what the authors call focused and integrated.  Focused firms had a 
more internal, narrow and technology focused strategy while integrated firms followed a 
broader strategy of investments in alternate energies and dialogue with multiple stakeholders.  
While their study blurs the conventional distinction between reactive and proactive firms it is 
interesting that regardless of differences in time perspectives and climate change strategies 
there was no evidence of reduced emissions in either integrated or focused firms.  
Continuing with the theme of time but shifting the unit of analysis to the institutional 
level Buhr (2012) examines the temporal conditions of institutional entrepreneurship.  In 
describing the institutional processes and contestations surrounding the inclusion of the 
aviation industry into the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, Buhr (2012) shows 
how institutional entrepreneurs in the aviation industry opposed regulatory constraints and 
additional taxation and created a window of opportunity to promote emissions trading as the 
most ‘flexible’ and ‘business friendly’ climate policy.  Emissions trading became an 
acceptable policy (as opposed to taxation) through a process of hegemonic accommodation 
where over time climate policy discussions shifted from analyzing the effectiveness of 
emissions trading as a policy measure to focusing on the design of such a scheme and how it 
would be implemented.  For industry actors the aim was to avoid taxation or any other 
regulatory measure.  As political and social pressures to implement climate policy increased 
the aviation industry also became a proponent of emissions trading because it would provide 
firms the legitimacy it needed to expand their operations.  There was now a policy to address 
the problem of climate change as well as the political conditions to adopt such a policy.  The 
NGO sector remained skeptical about the effectiveness if emissions trading as a measure to 
reduce emissions but ultimately accommodated the policy as a ‘practical’ necessity because 
they did not want to alienate the European Commission which wanted the aviation industry to 
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pay more attention to their climate impact.  Buhr’s analysis shows that the timing of the 
policy was not just due to favorable conditions but was an outcome of specific actions by 
institutional entrepreneurs to promote a policy that suited their interests. 
Emissions trading and carbon markets are also the subjects of the next paper by Veal 
and Mouzas (2012).  The basic assumption of carbon markets appears logically sound from a 
purely economic perspective: putting a price on carbon would reduce externalities and 
provide financial incentives for polluting firms to reduce their emissions.  However, like most 
economic theories this assumption breaks down in practice because of the political 
contestations involved in the policy making process.  In their analysis of carbon markets Veal 
and Mouzas (2012) found significant discrepancies between the aims of carbon markets and 
its operation in practice.  While the aim of pricing carbon was to provide incentives that 
would make emissions reduction a strategic issue, in practice the firms that the authors 
studied framed emissions trading as a compliance issue.  The interest of the regulators was to 
reduce CO2 at least cost and make carbon a strategic issue for firms participating in emissions 
reductions.  However, in practice emissions trading was seen as just another regulatory 
mechanism or a threat that needed to be managed and the firms strategic focus remained 
focused on maximizing production, improving quality and reducing costs.  There were no 
significant innovations or investment in low carbon technologies because the carbon price 
was too low to change corporate behavior.  Contestations about the design of the policy also 
saw an over-allocation of permits.  Emissions trading, which is the center piece of a market-
based climate policy measure is a perfect example of regulatory capture where regulators 
intending to control polluting behavior of firms instead end up protecting the interests of the 
firms.  Risk management and compliance strategies will not reduce emissions significantly 
nor will it spur innovation.  The fact that the energy sector is continuing to construct new coal 
powered plants that have a 40-year lifespan makes it clear that we are not going to see any 
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radical change based on current policy measures.  Again, as in Buhr’s study (2012) the 
conditions in which firms participated in emissions trading were created through a process of 
hegemonic accommodation. 
The papers thus far have examined climate change responses at the individual, 
organization and institutional levels.  The final paper by Böhm, Misoczky and Moog (2012) 
takes an international political economy approach to develop a critique of carbon markets and 
the green economy.  While the Buhr (2012) and Veal & Mouzas (2012) papers highlight how 
the politics of climate policy are ultimately undermined by the economics of climate changed 
as defined by powerful corporate interests interacting with state and civil society actors, 
Böhm, Misoczky and Moog (2012) provide a more powerful critique of carbon markets.  
Capitalism under the assumption of limitless growth is largely responsible for the 
environmental crisis facing the world.  But capitalism has also shown remarkable resilience 
in adapting to crises in the past and has adapted its accumulation process accordingly.  Not 
surprisingly the received view in the organization and management literature is that 
capitalism will adapt itself to solve the environmental and social crises it created, according 
to management gurus like Michael Porter and Base of the Pyramid advocates C.K. Prahalad 
and Stuart Hart.  Böhm, Misoczky and Moog (2012) not only reject this assumption but, 
drawing from Marxist critiques argue that rather than represent a transformation of capitalism 
to more sustainable forms of organizing the political economy, carbon markets reflect the 
ongoing expansion of capitalism through the commodification of nature leading to more 
inequities and uneven development.  So called ‘climate capitalism’ is not the solution but the 
problem.  Carbon markets may lead to some degree of decarbonization of the economy 
(although as the authors point out, current evidence indicates otherwise) but rather than being 
a benign force carbon markets are a form of accumulation by dispossession by global elites 
leading to further impoverishment and disempowerment of the global underclass.  The 
 31 
authors develop a Marxist analysis of international policy mechanisms under the Kyoto 
Protocol and argue that carbon markets will further exacerbate inequities, promote uneven 
development and deepen the North-South divide. 
So where do we go from here?  As a thought experiment if this special issue was to be 
convened in 2050 what would a call for papers look like?  Would we still be researching the 
same tiresome win-win questions and bemoaning the lack of action by world leaders?  Or 
would the catastrophic effects of climate change have already occurred and the focus would 
have shifted to mitigation and addressing the economic, social and political upheavals arising 
from mass migration of millions of people?  The kinds of questions we ask now to inform 
climate policy will determine the questions we will ask 30 years later so it is imperative we 
move beyond quick fixes like energy efficiency or public relations exercises like CSR to ask 
fundamental questions about the purpose of a firm and how it should be governed.   
According to McKibben (2012) based on the record of failure in addressing climate 
change we know what strategies and policies don’t work: changing individual consumerist 
lifestyles for example, because current participation in ‘green’ lifestyles is so minimal that it 
has a negligible impact.  Nor can we expect that the invisible hand of enlightened self-interest 
will stop global warming.  And as we have seen earlier (also Böhm, Misoczky and Moog, 
2012) putting a price on carbon still does not enable internalizing externalities because the 
fossil fuel industry and their lobbyists will accommodate any price as long as it does not 
threaten the profitability of their industry.  Expecting meaningful action on climate change 
through the political system has also produced limited outcomes and hopes of reaching an 
international binding agreement limiting emissions are at the lowest ebb since negotiations 
began 20 years ago.  McKibben (2012) claims there is a need for ‘moral outrage’ for a truly 
global social movement on climate change to emerge.  The key question then is how does this 
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moral outrage come about and in what way can it inform policy and bring about institutional 
and political change? 
Perhaps one way to reframe the climate change debate is to shift the focus from 
climate change to climate justice.  Carbon trading is a technical fix for what is basically a 
political problem over resource access.  There is no doubt that over the past 250 years there 
has been both overuse and unequal use of the atmosphere.  Millions of people in the 
developing world have suffered untold misery as resources have been extracted from their 
land in the name of development, which continues to elude them (Banerjee, 2008b).  The 
proposed solutions– carbon markets, carbon offsets, clean development mechanisms – merely 
transfer the right to pollute while continuing unequal and undemocratic use of resources and 
deflecting attention for collective political action (Whiteman, Dorsey & Wittneben, 2010).  
For moral outrage to acquire critical mass what is required is the mobilization of dispossessed 
people at global, national, regional and local levels and direct action against the fossil fuel 
industry in an attempt to disrupt the ‘institutional settlement’ (Zysman, 1994) of climate 
policy regimes.  A climate change social movement by global elites will see a continuation of 
policies that consolidate their power.  The discourse needs to shift from corporate social 
responsibility and corporate citizenship to corporate accountability and more democratic 
control over corporate activity.  Organization and management theory has a crucial role to 
play in this transformation process.  Our theories of capital accumulation and resource 
utilization have been largely responsible for the current crisis.  It is time we turn our attention 
to theories of wealth and resource distribution.  But that is a story for another special issue. 
 
Special thanks for this special issue 
A tremendous effort has gone into making this special issue a reality. We are indebted 
to David Courpasson, Editor-in-Chief at Organization Studies, for his encouragement and 
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support as well as the Managing Editor, Sophia Tzagaraki, for her remarkable help and 
endless patience.  Of course none of this would be possible without our reviewers who have 
worked tirelessly to provide constructive criticism and develop the manuscripts. Their names 
are listed on a separate page at the end of this special issue and we would like to thank them 
for their outstanding work.  We would like to thank all authors who have answered our call 
for papers.  It was not an easy task to select the seven papers that make up this special issue 
from the large number of quality submissions we received.  We are sure that many of the 
papers that were not included here will be published in other outlets and we encourage these 
authors to continue their important work.  We thank the fifteen authors who are part of the 
special issue for their excellent scholarship and willingness to work with the reviewers and 
ourselves to develop their ideas.  We are particularly pleased that so many female scholars 
are amongst the authors of this special issue. As climate change is a global issue, it is also 
very appropriate that the special issue authorship and the empirical work conducted span 
continents and hemispheres.  
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